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CHARITABLE GIFTS OF INCOME AND THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE:
ANOTHER VIEW
Boris I. Bittker *
N the November, 1951, issue of this Review Dean Griswold
commented on two controversial recent rulings of the Treas-
ury.' His remarks were partly prompted by a criticism of these
rulings by Mr. Robert N. Miller, whom Dean Griswold felicitously
calls "the dean of the tax bar," in the Tax Law Review. 2 May I
take issue with both deans and toss a brickbat in passing at the
Treasury?
The first ruling held that a farmer who made a gift of home-
grown wheat to a charity could deduct its fair market value as a
charitable contribution (subject to the usual fifteen percent limi-
tation) but must also include that value in gross income.3 The
farmer had deducted the cost of raising the wheat as a business
expense and presumably had hoped to deduct its value as a chari-
table contribution. The Treasury allowed the two deductions, but,
by requiring the value of the wheat to be included in gross income,
it taxed the farmer as though he had sold the crop for cash and
donated the proceeds to the charity.
The ruling purports to rest upon Helvering v. Horst,4 and Mr.
Miller strongly urges that its footing is weak. His criticism stems
partly from his view that Horst is a "fruit and tree" I case - that
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., Cornell, 1938; LL.B., Yale, 194'.
Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Revenue Code, 65
HARv. L. REv. 84 (I95i) (hereinafter Griswold). The author has also had the
benefit of correspondence with Dean Griswold on this subject.
' Miller, Gifts of Income and of Property: What the Horst Case Decides, 5
TAx L. REV. I (1949).
'I.T. 391o, 1948-I CuM. Bi=.. 15. The principle enunciated in the ruling was
applied by a later ruling to a dealer's contribution of building materials to a civil
defense organization. Special Ruling, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAx REP. ff 6125 (Oct. 8,
1951).
4 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
a Molloy, indeed, holds the Horst case liable for sowing "a lamentable host of
horticultural metaphors." Molloy, Some Tax Aspects of Corporate Distributions in
Kind, 6 TAx L. REv. 57, 61 (195o). In point of fact, Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. xii
(1930), is the culprit.
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the father by keeping the bond and giving his son only the interest
coupons had retained
the sole source out of which this income flowed . . . . The same result
would have been achieved in that case if the father had merely written a
letter to the obligor constituting his son his nominee to receive payment
of the interest and authorizing the son to keep the money instead of
passing it back to his father, the bond owner. . . . The further running
of interest in anyone's favor could, in fact, have been stopped at any
time by the father's accepting payment of the principal from the
obligor.'
In the case of the farmer, of course, the donee's control over the
donated property is unqualified. The only trouble with Mr.
Miller's theory is that it rests upon the incorrect assumption that
the interest coupons in the Horst case had no "independent value"
apart from the bond. In point of fact, the coupons were negotiable,
and it was precisely for this reason that Chief Justice Hughes and
Justices McReynolds and Roberts dissented in the Horst case
and that Judge Patterson had held below that the donor was not
taxable:
The petitioner could not interfere in any way with the donee's control
and right to receive the money when the coupons matured. . . . Gen-
erally liability to income tax attaches to ownership of the income, Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, and we see nothing to take the case out of the
general rule. The case is not one where the assignor had power over the
income after the assignment, as in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376.7
The Horst case, then, cannot be limited, as Mr. Miller suggests, to
situations wherein the donor retains a power to veto the donee's
claim. This is made doubly clear by Helvering v. Eubank,8 de-
cided the same day as the Horst case, where the Court held the
assignor of a contract taxable on sums paid pursuant to it, though
he had relinquished all rights under it. The court so decided "For
the reasons stated at length in the opinion in the Horst case." o
6 Miller, supra note 2, at 6.
io7 F.2d 9o6, 907 (2d Cir. 1939).
311 U.S. 122 (1940).
t Id. at 125. The reasons so "stated at length" require a little trimming to fit
the Eubank case. See Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax:
Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. I~v. 779, 789-9o (i94i).
Judge Wyzanski's recent description of the Massachusetts Supreme judicial
Court is apposite here, if seldom elsewhere in the United States Supreme Court's
recent work: "Subtle variations and blurred lines are not characteristic of that
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Mr. Miller's criticism of the ruling also rests upon the fact that
it treats the gift itself as a realization of income, whereas the Horst
case treats the donee's receipt of the funds as the taxable event.
If this were the ruling's only departure from the Horst case, the
Treasury could of course easily meet Mr. Miller's objection with-
out aiding the farmer. The only change required would be to tax
the farmer on the fair market value of the crop when it is either
sold or otherwise disposed of by the charity.'0
To my mind, it is profitless in judging the Treasury ruling to
seize upon this phrase or that detail of the Horst case. There are
both similarities and differences; room for the ruling might be
found at the Horst case's ample bosom, or it might be turned away.
The arguments have been well canvassed elsewhere," and they are
less than conclusive.
Whatever the courts may ultimately say of the ruling's validity,12
the Treasury has a responsibility for administering the tax laws in
an intelligent manner. The legally permissible should be the only
boundary no more in tax administration than in official morality.
This responsibility for orderly administration seems to me to have
been abdicated here. The ruling is superficially persuasive, in that
it taxes a gift of the crop itself as though the crop had been sold
and the proceeds donated to the charity; there is certainly a pre-
sumption in favor of treating functionally identical transactions
the same regardless of differences in form. Yet in saying that these
two transactions having the same nontax results shall be taxed the
same, the Treasury treats the farmer differently from other
philanthropic taxpayers, and it is for this reason that I think the
ruling was inadvisable.
court. Principles are announced and adhered to in broad magisterial terms."
Pomerantz v. Clark, ioi F. Supp. 341, 346 (D. Mass. Ig5r).
"The wheat involved in the ruling itself was to be distributed by the charity.
" Note, Gratuitous Disposition of Property as Realization of Income, 62 HARV.
L. REv. 1I81 (1949); see the thoughtful comments of Surrey, supra note 9, at
784-92.
12 In White v. Brodrick, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. 9238 (D. Kan. March 6,
1952), it was held that a farmer did not realize income by a charitable contribution
of wheat, though his costs had been deducted. There was no opinion and the ruling
was not mentioned. The farmer had not claimed the contribution as a charitable
deduction, though his other contributions were less than rs% of his adjusted gross
income. In a Special Ruling, g CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. 6125 (Oct. 8, n95I), the
Bureau stated that the Tax Court in W. G. Farrier's Estate, iS T.C. 277 (195o),
reached a "contrary conclusion" to that of I.T. 3910. But the Farrier case involved
a gift to a noncharitable donee, so that there was no possibility of a double de-
duction.
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The trouble with the ruling, to my mind, is that the taxpayer
who contributes appreciated securities to a charity may deduct
their full fair market value without reporting his "unrealized"
gain as income. He is not taxed as though he had sold the stock
and then donated the proceeds to charity. Although this curious
rule cannot be defended on logical grounds, 3 both Mr. Miller and
Dean Griswold point out that Congress seems unwilling to change
it 1' and both quite rightly assume that the Treasury's ruling must
be examined within this framework."5
Dean Griswold urges in support of the Treasury ruling that the
farmer has "realized" his income when he harvests his wheat.
Although, says Dean Griswold, for reasons of convenience "the
tax law has long taken the obvious practical route" of allowing the
farmer to postpone reporting the income until the crop is sold, "if
the farmer frustrates the objective of the concession, by giving
away the income already realized, it seems entirely appropriate to
require the farmer to include in his return the amount of the in-
13 Among other shortcomings it may penalize the taxpayer who is not properly
guided for doing what comes naturally, since if he pledges a specific amount in a
charitable drive he probably will realize income on satisfying the pledge with
appreciated securities.
"aThe "rule" rests upon U.S. Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.23(o)-I (z943). See Gris-
wold at 9i n.20. In actuality this regulation merely allows fair market value to be
deducted; it does not say that the gift itself is not a realization of that part of the
value which equals the property's appreciation over its adjusted basis. But tax-
payers and the Treasury have long acted as though this were the unstated conse-
quence of the regulation. A proposed statutory change (limiting the deduction to
cost) was rejected in 1938. Griswold at 92 n.z. -It is now unlikely that the
Treasury would attempt either to tax the gift as'a realization or to amend the
regulation so as to limit the deduction to cost. This is true despite the fact that
much of what Mr. justice Stone wrote in the Horst case fits the charitable gift of
appreciated securities like a glove:
The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained
the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure
those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of
procuring them .... Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income,
to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money
or property, would seem to be the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfac-
tion is the purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the payment of his debt there,
or such non-material satisfactions as may result from the payment of a campaign
or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son. 311 U.S. at 117.
" To be sure, the donor of appreciated securities ordinarily avoids only a capital
gain, whereas the donor of farm products would, in the absence of the ruling,
ordinarily avoid the reporting of ordinary income. It would be hazardous, however,
to conclude that the average farmer's tax rate on ordinary income is greater than
the rate that the average investor would pay on his securities profits. Moreover,'
there is nothing in the history of the rule on charitable gifts, let alone in the Horst
case, to suggest that a gift should be treated as a realization of ordinary income but
not of capital gain.
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come which he has already realized, even though he has not con-
verted it into cash." 10 Given the regulation exempting the appre-
ciation on donated securities,17 I cannot agree. The value of an
agricultural crop at the time of its harvest seems to me no more
significant than the value of an investor's property at year's end
or at any other time prior to its sale or other disposition. Un-
realized appreciation or depreciation is treated as inconsequential
in the investor's case because the property is still at the mercy of
the market; 18 so too the value of the farmer's wheat is still de-
pendent upon the fluctuations of the market.1 9 Neither taxpayer
has yet enjoyed more than a paper profit.2" This is not to say that
a sale for cash is essential to recognition of income; of course it is
not. If either the investor or the farmer traded his property for
shoes or ships or sealing wax he would clearly have a profit that
18 Griswold at 87. The value at the time of gift may be very different from
the value at the time of harvesting. Dean Griswold's rationale for the Treasury
ruling would require reporting the latter value, though the ruling itself apparently
takes the value at the time of gift as crucial.
11 See note 14 supra. The regulation speaks only of a contribution "other than
money." In emphasizing its applicability to appreciated securities I am merely
taking the most frequent example of its use. It may be noted that on its face the
regulation is as applicable to agricultural products as to any other kind of property.
18 Perhaps our tax system would be improved if such "unrealized" gain or loss
had to be accrued; but the Code does not now impose such a requirement. Of
course, as Dean Griswold points out, "income may be realized in a medium other
than cash," Griswold at 87; familiar examples are compensation in kind under
U.S. Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.22(a)-3 (1943) and barters under INT. RPv. CODE
§ ixi(b). But in these cases there is a realization of income for all purposes: the
taxpayer gets a basis for the property so that subsequent gains or losses are
separately reckoned up, so that he may depreciate the property, so that he may
take a casualty loss, and so forth. In the case of crops, as Dean Griswold recognizes,
harvesting is not a realization of income for any of these purposes.
" The act of harvesting, it happens, is a physical severance. But though this
means that one who wrongfully appropriates the grain is a thief rather than a tres-
passer and though it may be important in other branches of the law, I find no tax
significance to it. The value of the crop varies constantly from the date the seed
is sowed until the grain is sold; the date of harvest seems to me no more important
for income tax purposes than the last day of the taxable year. That Dean Griswold
is overemphasizing a neutral act - severance- is shown by his statement that his
support of the ruling would fail if the farmer gave the standing crop to the charity,
allowing the charity to make its own arrangements for harvesting the crop, Griswold
at 88 n.iS. In these circumstances, presumably Dean Griswold would find no
realization of income. Surely the timing of the gift should not be this important.
20 If before sale the farmer gets a Government commodity loan without personal
liability, something can be said for taxing him on the proceeds of the loan; to that
extent, he is protected against future market fluctuations. See Lurie, Mortgagor's
Gain on Mortgaging Property for More than Cost without Personal Liability, 6
TAx L. REV. 319 (i95i). But cf. Woodsam Associates, Inc., z6 T.C. 649 (zgz).
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would be - and ought to be - taxed. Nor am I making a consti-
tutional objection to taxing the farmer when his crop is severed
but before it is disposed of; I do not doubt that he could be taxed
at that point. Despite Eisner v. Macomber,2 I think all taxpayers
could be put on an annual inventory basis with appreciation and
depreciation being tallied up and taken into the tax return at
year's end.
Thus, the farmer's wheat and the investor's appreciation seem
to me to be comparable whether the issue is constitutional liability
to tax or desirable tax policy. We do not say that an investor has
received a "concession" in being allowed to postpone gain until
the property has been sold or that he has "frustrated" the objective
of that concession if he gives the property away.22 Neither, it
seems to me, has the farmer. If the investor doesn't realize income
when he gives appreciated property away, why should the farmer
realize it when he harvests a crop that he subsequently gives away?
- Dean Griswold's answer to this question is that the farmer is
giving away
what might be called an "income" item. It is an item produced in the
course of trade or business, and which, upon sale, would be fully in-
cludible in gross income ... 3
. ..The gift of appreciated property [for example, securities] is not
the same as the gift of "income." There are similarities, but there is one
important distinction. The gift of appreciated property does not involve
any double deduction. 24
212 52 U.S. 189 (1920).22 Dean Griswold uses § 44(d) as an analogy, Griswold at 87 n.14; it provides
that if a taxpayer elects to postpone gain represented by an installment obligation
he must account for the gain thus postponed upon giving the obligation away by
reporting the difference between its basis and its value. But here the taxpayer does
have a closed transaction upon the sale of the property on an installment basis;
postponement of his gain is a "concession" the purpose of which would be "frus-
trated" if he could give the obligation away with impunity. Section 126(a) (2),
Dean Griswold's other analogy, is similarly limited to items that unquestionably
constitute income, though because of the decedent's accounting method they have
not yet been reported. An account receivable, for example, if unreported by the
decedent because he was on a cash receipts and disbursements basis, must be
reported by the estate when collected, when sold, or when given away. But items
that are not realized income (for example, appreciated property) are not taxable
under § 126(a) (2) when given away. Of the two types of items, the latter are more
analogous to the farmer's wheat.
23 Griswold at 86.
24 Griswold at 92.
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Using this distinction to separate the farmer's charitable contribu-
tion from the investor's, Dean Griswold supports the Treasury in
ruling that the farmer realizes income on the gift. He goes on,
however, to propose an alternative way of dealing with the prob-
lem. This entails a statutory change and employs his distinction
between a gift of an "income" item and a gift of appreciated prop-
erty. The proposal is to deny the charitable deduction when the
gift is of inventory or of other property "the proceeds of which
would be fully included in gross income if the property were
sold." 25
This distinction between "income" items and other property-
the crux of Dean Griswold's position- seems to me insufficient
to justify either the Treasury ruling or the alternative treatment
proposed by Dean Griswold. Dean Griswold himself acknowl-
edges the partial inadequacy of the distinction in the case of
property that has given rise to depreciation deductions in past
years.26 Here the deduction of full market value in the year of
gift may result in a double deduction just as in the farmer's case17
The Treasury ruling is silent on the treatment of such property.
Dean Griswold would not deny the double deduction here,2 though
he would deny it to the farmer. Moreover, even nondepreciable
property may have given rise to deductions under Section
23 (a) (2), so that the deduction of fair market value at the time
of gift might involve a double deduction.29 These double deduc-
2 5 Ibid.
26 Griswold at 92 n.23.
27 This would be true if the depreciation deductions exceeded the decline in
market value caused by the use of the property. If the excess of market value
over adjusted basis were caused simply by appreciation, however, the allowance
of a charitable deduction equal to the full market value would involve no
duplication of deductions.
2 Where the property was fully depreciated, however, apparently the chari-
table deduction would be denied because, in the language of Dean Griswold's
proposed statute, "the proceeds of [the property] would be fully included in gross
income if the property were sold." The shrewd taxpayer would give such property
away while a tiny basis remained, thus obtaining a charitable deduction for its full
fair market value. (I am assuming that Dean Griswold's phrase "fully included"
simply means that the property's adjusted basis is zero, whether the profit on sale
would be ordinary income or capital gain.)
"An example would be the deduction of the cost of safekeeping of a non-
interest-bearing bond. Since these costs relate solely to holding the bond for
appreciation, a subsequent charitable deduction of the full value would involve a
duplication. If the bond is interest-bearing, the custodial costs are partially al-
locable to the production of income over the period of holding, but the rest of
these costs would have been deducted and a charitable deduction of the bond's
full value would entail a double deduction.
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tions would not be touched by either Dean Griswold's proposal or
the Treasury ruling. Finally, property may have a zero basis -
Dean Griswold's test for denying the charitable deduction -
although its production gave rise to no deductions either under
Section 23 (a) or as part of the cost of goods sold. This category.
would include inventions, literary and musical compositions,
works of art, and even, in the case of the family farm, some
agricultural products. Here there is no danger of a double deduc-
tion, yet the Griswold proposal would deny the charitable deduc-
tion altogether.
A more fundamental objection to both the Treasury ruling
and the Griswold proposJl is that their remedies do not fit the
disease. Neither takes any account of the extent to which there
actually are overlapping deductions. The market value of an
agricultural product may reflect heavy deductible expenditures
and little appreciation in value, or it may represent only minor
expenses with great appreciation. In the former case, a charitable
deduction in full would be largely a second deduction of expenses
already charged off; in the latter case, only a small part of the
charitable deduction would duplicate charged off expenses. Yet
the Griswold proposal would deny the charitable deduction en-
tirely in both cases, while the Treasury ruling, in allowing the
charitable deduction, would compel it to be offset by the recogni-
tion of income. To my mind, the farmer should not be allowed a
double deduction, but neither should he be required to recognize
the appreciation any more than the security investor.
This brings me to my own solution of the problem: to allow
the value of the crop as a charitable deduction without reporting
the value as income, but to disallow the expenses of raising the
crop. This would prevent the double deduction to which both
Dean Griswold and the Treasury properly object, while granting
to the farmer the same privilege now enjoyed by the investor of
deducting the full value of appreciated property without recog-
nizing the appreciation as income.
While legislation to this end would be desirable, I incline to the.
belief that it would not be necessary: the expense of raising a
crop that is not sold is simply not an "ordinary and necessary"
expense of carrying on a trade or business.30 There is a precedent
3oSee Griswold at 85 n.6. See also INT. REv. CoDE § 24(a)(i) (personal ex-
penses not deductible); U.S. Treas. Reg. xii, § 29.23(a)-I (x943) (no double
deductions).
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for such a disallowance in the treatment of the cost of raising
farm produce consumed by the farmer and his family; such costs
are not deductible.8 It would of course be necessary to allocate
many expenses among the products that are in fact sold and those
that are given away; this must now be done for home-consumed
produce and, under the Revenue Act of 1951, for an unharvested
crop sold with the land."2 Once the expenses to be disallowed have
been identified, the statute of limitations would rarely interpose a
barrier to disallowance, since most of the expenses in question
would undoubtedly have arisen in the year of harvest or in the
preceding year.
83
No doubt it will be argued that if the farmer does not raise the
crop with the charity in mind, deciding only later to make the
contribution, his expenses are "ordinary and necessary expenses"
under Section 23(a) on the facts known when paid or incurred.
His subsequent charitable impulse, especially if it bursts out in a
later year, ought not - the argument will continue - to result
in retroactive disallowance of the expenses. If this objection is
valid, it can be met by legislation, though a Treasury regulation
along the lines indicated would to my mind be more consistent
with the present law than the ruling that was issued.
What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If the
farmer is to be denied a double deduction, the investor should be
placed under an equal disability. The problem here is less serious,
since ordinarily the investor's expenses under Section 23(a) (2)
would be minor in amount and sometimes incapable of allocation
to the donated securities. The owner of depreciable property
ought also to be treated harmoniously with the farmer, to the
extent that a charitable deduction of fair market value would
duplicate his deductions for depreciation in past years.34 There
3' Form I04oF, p. 4.3 2 INT. REV. CODE §§ 24(f), 1x3(b) (i) (L), 1 7 (j) (3).
3 If the crop basis of accounting is employed, the expenses, no matter when
incurred, would not be deducted until the year of disposition of the crop. U.S.
Treas. Reg. ii, §§ 29.22(a)-7, 29.23(a)-I (X943).
3' See note 27 supra. As a practical matter, it may be difficult to distinguish
between the effects of excessive depredation deductions and appreciation in value.
Presumably this would require a comparison of the value of the donated property
with the value of undepreciated property at the time of the gift to determine the
proportion of the original cost properly allocable to the preceding period of its use.
In the usual case, however, it would seem reasonable to accept the depreciation
deductions already allowed as proper and to allow a charitable contribution deduc-
tion of the full market value.
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is here an administrative complication, however. If the taxpayer
has owned the property for a long period, retroactive disallowance
of excessive depreciation deductions would require stale returns
to be reopened. Perhaps instead such a taxpayer's charitable
deduction should be the value of the property less any previous
excessive reductions of its basis.85 Then he too would be able to
recover his original cost plus appreciation - but no more-
without realizing income thereby.
Finally, Dean Griswold's widget manufacturer: How should
a gift of widgets to a charity be taxed? The manufacturer will
get a double deduction if he can include the expense as part of his
cost of goods sold without taking anything into income and at the
same time can deduct their value as a charitable contribution. 6
Dean Griswold suggests "an adjustment of the inventory," in
recognition of the fact that the widgets were not sold, and I
would agree.37  Then allowing the manufacturer to deduct the
fair market value of the widgets as a contribution to charity would
give him the same privilege as to unrealized appreciation that is
3' Restricting the deduction to that part of the property's value in excess of
the previous deductions which would otherwise be duplicated would be authorized
by U.S. Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.23(a)-i (x943). In fact, this solution to the bogey
of double deductions could be adopted for all contributions, including the farmer's
wheat. It would have only these defects, not shared by the solution suggested in
the text: the deduction might be split between two years, rather than allocated to
the year of gift; and the 15% limitation of § 23(o) would be ignored to the extent
that the total allowable deduction took the form of a business or depreciation,
rather than a charitable contribution, deduction. This latter defect is shared by
Dean Griswold's proposed statute.
'6 The double deduction would occur in the year of the gift, no matter when
the manufacturing expense was incurred, if inventory is valued at cost. This is
because inclusion of the expense in the cost of goods sold would have been offset
by the inclusion of the widgets themselves in inventory, leaving the manufacturer's
tax liability unaffected by the expense until the widgets are removed from inventory.
If the inventory was reduced to a lower market value, however, part of the manu-
facturing expense would have reduced income in the year of inventory revaluation.
"7 Griswold at 85 n.6. The adjustment would be simple in the case where the
goods were manufactured in the year of the contribution, requiring only disallow-
ance of the allocable expenses. If the expense had been incurred in an earlier year,
on the other hand, it would be reflected in opening inventory, and the widgets
would be removed from closing inventory. To make an adjustment in this case,
the cost of the widgets could be credited to Cost of Goods Sold and debited to
Gifts to Charity or an equivalent account, thus counterbalancing the reduction of
income caused by removing the widgets from the closing inventory. This appears
to be current accounting practice, and it avoids the necessity of adjusting the open-
ing inventory. Deducting the fair market value of the widgets as a charitable con-
tribution would then give the manufacturer an allowance for the cost plus the
appreciation of the property, but without any double deduction.
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now enjoyed by the investor and that would be enjoyed under
my proposal by the farmer.
The other Treasury ruling to which both Dean Griswold and
Mr. Miller direct their attention held that a taxpayer realized
income when he gave some cattle to his son.18 The cattle were
raised in the ordinary course of his business, so that the father's
expenses had been deducted and his basis was zero. The cattle
were worth $i5oo at the time of gift and eight months later were
sold by the son for $21oo. The Treasury ruled that the father
realized income on the gift in the amount of $i~oo and that the
son realized $6oo of income on selling the animals. The cattleman
and his son presumably hoped that the father would have no
income on the transaction, that the son's basis would be the same
as his father's, under Section 113(a) (2), and that the son's in-
come on sale would be $2 100.
Much could be said for taxing any appreciation in the value of
property to its owner when he disposes of it by either inter vivos
or testamentary gift. But Congress has chosen another course of
action, and the Code now provides by Section 113 (a) (2) that the
donor does not realize income by an inter vivos gift and that his
donee shall take over his donor's basis.3 9
Now, while the Treasury Department ought not to be niggardly
in accepting an unpalatable decision by Congress, it is not under
any more of a duty than the taxpayer to reduce its revenue to the
smallest possible sum. The public interest may be served by
challenging the efforts of taxpayers to make a fortress out of this
or that detail of the Code. The litigation policy that culminated
in Helvering v. Clifford,4" for example, seems to me not only
proper but laudable in its refusal to accept Sections 166 and 167
as the sole line of demarcation between taxing the grantor of a
trust and taxing the trustee or beneficiary. But even from this
viewpoint, which of course many would condemn as unduly
latitudinarian, I am troubled by the ruling in question, since I
find no adequate way to differentiate the transaction there con-
" I.T. 3932, X948-2 Cu.m. BuLr. 7. In W. G. Farrier's Estate, iS T.C. 277
(igo), the Tax Court, without either endorsing or rejecting this ruling, held that
it was inapplicable where the donee had not sold the donated cattle.
3'To be sure, § 113 (a) (2) merely establishes the donee's basis, without ex-
plicitly relieving the donor of tax liability for the difference between his basis and
the property's value. But this exemption of the donor flows by negative inference:
there was surely no intent to tax the same increment to both donor and donee.
40 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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sidered from the generality of transactions subject to Section
113(a)(2).
Is it the Treasury's view that, notwithstanding Section I13 (a)
(2), a gift constitutes a realization of income (with a correspond-
ingly stepped-up basis for the donee) whenever the donor has had
deductions attributable to the donated property? Such a rule
would embrace depreciable property as well as inventory property
and stock in trade; it might even include securities. There being
no question here of a double deduction, there is to my mind even
less reason to distinguish among various types of appreciated
property than in the case of charitable contributions. Is the rul-
ing limited to property with a zero basis? If so, what in the Horst
case - upon which the ruling purports to rest - affords a basis
for distinguishing between property with a zero basis and other
property?
The tax abuse at which the ruling is directed, I take it, does not
grow out of the property's zero basis. The Treasury's complaint is
rather: (a) that income is being diverted by the gift from the
father to the son; (b) that in the process of transfer the income
ultimately reported may be converted from ordinary income (the
property not being a capital asset in the hands of the father) to
capital gain (if the son does not hold for sale to customers);"
and (c) that the father has had the benefit of business deductions
in creating the donated property.
Problem (a) is as old as the income tax, and the gift in question
should be subject to the same rules as any other intra-family di-
version of income. In a proper case the total income, not just the
increment to the date of gift, could be taxed to the father. Such
action would be authorized by Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co.,"2 for example, when its criteria are met. Imputing the in-
come to the father under that decision would not fly in the teeth
of Section 13 (a) (2), as does the ruling, since instead of mechan-
ical application there would be a consideration of motive, prear-
rangement and other factors. Or -again under proper circum-
stances - the Treasury might tax the entire income to the donor
4 The Treasury's view, embodied in this ruling, is that the cattle were not
capital assets in the hands of the son because of § 117(a) (I) (A). It does not
appear whether this is because the son was himself in the livestock business (apart
from this transaction), because this transaction alone was sufficient to characterize
the cattle as business property, or because the father's status is in the Treasury's
opinion to be visited upon his son.
42324 U.S. 33z (1945).
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under Lucas v. Earl,43 upon a showing that it was the result of the
father's personal services, or under the Clifford case, upon a show-
ing that the donor's control was not terminated by the transfer.
Section 113(a) (2) makes it quite clear, however, that prospec-
tive income (in the form of unrealized appreciation on property)
can be reallocated by some gifts; the ruling either seeks to deny
this obvious fact of life or else rests upon a carefully concealed
distinction between the gifts to which it was intended to apply
and those that remain subject to Section 113(a)(2).
The conversion of a noncapital asset into a capital asset by
transferring it from the professional father to the amateur son
is unquestionably a problem of importance, though of course the
repeated use of the scheme will bring the son into the professional
class and thus defeat its own purpose. This may have been the
abuse at which the ruling is aimed,4  though it does not purport
to be so limited, and there is nothing in the Horst case - on which
the ruling is built - to indicate that as a general rule income
is to be attributed to the donor when to attribute it to the donee
would change its character. It should be noted that farmers and
cattlemen are not the only ones who might seek to avail them-
selves of this loophole; it might be exploited by any taxpayer
holding inventory property or stock in trade, or even real estate.4 5
In any event, the transmutation is important only as it reduces
the family total tax burden, and it is merely another facet-
though a flashy one - of the general problem of reallocating
income within the family in order to lessen the impact of the
graduated income tax.46 The Treasury can hardly deny that Sec-
43 28I U.S. III (1930).
" In W. G. Farrier's Estate, 15 T.C. 277 (ig5o), the Commissioner sought to
tax the donor of cattle on their value at the time of gift. The Commissioner's
deficiency was limited to part of the donated cattle, possibly .to those whose sale
by the donor would have resulted in the realization of ordinary income (rather
than capital gain). The Tax Court held no income was realized by the donor.
See note 38 supra.
45 If the donor held real property used in his trade or business, a sale by him
would have resulted in ordinary income, INT. REV. CODE § I17(a) (I) (B) ; Fackler
v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 5o9 (6th Cir. 1943), unless the peculiar conditions of
§ 117(j) are met. The donee, if he sold immediately, would be sure of capital gain
treatment.
46 Specific statutory provisions were thought necessary to combat similar trans-
mutations in two other areas. Section 117(a) (I) (C) provides that a copyright or
similar property shall not be a capital asset when held by its creator or by his
donee. Donees were placed on a par with their donors "to avoid a loophole."
SEN. REP. No. 2375, 8ist Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (i95o). The Revenue Act of i951
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tion i 13 (a) (2) is applicable by and large to gifts of appreciated
securities, despite the fact that the donee's tax rate on the income
is lower than the donor's. Whether the tax saving is achieved by
taking advantage of the son's lower tax bracket (as in the case of
securities) or of his amateur status (as in the case of livestock)
seems to me a mere matter of detail. If the Court Holding Co.,
Clifford, or Lucas cases are applicable, the income is taxed to the
father as though he had not disposed of it; if, on the other hand,
the conditions are not ripe for taxing the father on these theories,
the transaction should be reckoned as an effective transfer and
the son taxed in his own right.
Finally, as stated above, the Treasury in issuing its ruling may
have been aggrieved by the cattleman's business deductions.
Much can be said for disallowing the deductions on the theory
that they are permissible only when they contribute to the earn-
ing of income.4" If the taxpayer forswears the income itself, he
should not be able to claim that the expenses were "ordinary and
necessary" in carrying on his trade or business. I do not find any-
thing in the Horst case or elsewhere, however, to support the
Treasury's view, if it is the Treasury's view, that because of the
deductions the gift is a realization of income. Section 113 (a) (2)
contemplates that the donee is the donor's surrogate and takes
over the donor's basis. The donee's subsequent sale requires him
to recognize the same amount of income that the donor would have
recognized if he had held the property and sold it himself. There
is here no double deduction, as might occur in the case of a
charitable contribution of the same property.
amended § ii7(m) to prevent the conversion of stock in trade and inventory into
capital assets by the use of a "collapsible corporation." In recommending this
legislation, the House Committee on Ways and Means said that no inferences were
to be drawn as to the validity of the scheme in previous years. H.R. RP. No. 586,
82d Cong., ist Sess. 26 (ig5).
471f disallowed, the expenses would then constitute a basis which would be
transferred to the son under § 113 (a) (2).
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